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DIVERSITY AND RACE-NEUTRALITY 
Kenneth L. Marcus* 
The most important, elusive, and misunderstood aspect of federal af-
firmative action jurisprudence is the requirement of ―serious consideration.‖  
Before commencing or continuing race-conscious, nonremedial affirmative 
action plans, public institutions, including colleges and universities, must 
apply ―serious, good faith consideration‖ to workable race-neutral alterna-
tives (RNAs).1  This requires not only that less racially intrusive alternatives 
be unavailable, but also that institutions establish this unavailability through 
a largely undefined process of ―serious consideration.‖2  The measure one 
should use to establish this (un)availability remains unknown.  In higher 
education, since RNAs typically tout diversity, it is easy to assume that they 
should be measured against their ability to increase the representation of 
previously underrepresented student racial and ethnic groups.  In fact, such 
measures raise serious constitutional problems to the extent that they indi-
cate that the actual goal of the RNA‘s is racial balancing.  This Essay ar-
gues that because the only legally viable purpose for nonremedial race-
conscious admissions practices are ―the educational benefits that flow from 
a diverse student body,‖3 only direct measures of those educational benefits 
are proper for ―serious consideration.‖  In other words, RNAs must be eva-
luated against their ability to raise actual educational achievement. 
I. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE RNA REQUIREMENT 
RNAs are programs that strive to meet diversity goals in a manner that 





  Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of 
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Commission on Civil Rights (2004–2008) and was delegated the authority of Assistant Secretary of 
Education for Civil Rights (2003–2004).  An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the 15th An-
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  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003). 
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Marcus, ―Serious Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. 
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  COLLOQUY  
 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/39/ 164 
has developed over time.  It began as a scholarly analysis of the ―narrow 
tailoring‖ prong of the strict scrutiny test,5 and was introduced into affirma-
tive action jurisprudence in Justice Lewis Powell‘s Wygant opinion, which 
established that courts must ―give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a 
nonracial approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial classification could 
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative 
expense.‖6  RNAs were transformed by Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor‘s 
Croson, Adarand, and Grutter opinions into a separate, enforceable re-
quirement that public and educational institutions themselves seriously con-
sider race-neutrality before resorting to race-conscious measures.7  Most 
recently, the RNA requirement has been institutionalized in the Parents In-
volved in Community Schools decision as an independent basis for striking 
down affirmative action plans.8 
The requirement is important because its enforcement is at the same 
time both simple and complex.  In many cases, an institution may ignore 
race-neutral alternatives altogether and therefore be vulnerable to a legal 
challenge, which is quick, simple, and cheap.  This simplicity is in contrast 
with other grounds on which post-secondary racial preference schemes may 
be challenged, most of which are resource-intensive, factually complicated, 
and politically sensitive.  For example, a particular institution‘s admissions 
scheme might be challenged on whether it more closely resembles the Uni-
versity of Michigan‘s undergraduate college in Gratz v. Bollinger or its law 
school in Grutter v. Bollinger.  This determination may require considera-
ble fact-intensive review, subjective determinations, and a battle of expert 
witnesses. 
By contrast, if an institution has not even considered the use of race-
neutral alternatives, a challenge by the U.S. Department of Education‘s Of-
fice for Civil Rights or a private litigant is more or less cut and dried.9  





  See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578–79 (1975); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Dis-
crimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1972). 
6
  See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (Powell, J., plurality op.) (1986) 
(quoting Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 578–79 (1975)).  Specifically, Powell faulted the Board of Educa-
tion for resorting to layoffs of nonminority teachers when the use of hiring goals would have been less 
intrusive.  See id. at 283–84. 
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  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40. 
8
  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760–61 (2007).  For 
a more extensive discussion of the development of this doctrine, see La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 
(manuscript at Part I). 
9
  While most analyses focus on the prospect of litigation before Article III courts, it is my observa-
tion that administrative action by the Office for Civil Rights is both more frequent and more important.  
For an explanation of this point, see Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-
Semitism and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 WM. & MARY B. OF RTS. J. 837, 856–58 (2007). 
103:163  (2008) Diversity and Race Neutrality 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/39/ 165 
ducks in the face of any potential challenge.  In this sense, serious-
consideration cases are important because they are so easy for the plaintiff 
to prove.  In 2004, the Office for Civil Rights challenged a number of 
school districts for failing to consider race-neutral alternatives to the use of 
racial preferences in their magnet-school student assignment plans.  If the 
districts had actually considered RNAs, the permissibility of those prefe-
rences would have been a legally and politically difficult question; absent 
this consideration, the cases were much less difficult. 
The serious-consideration requirement, however, is not always this 
simple.  While serious consideration is clearly required, there is little guid-
ance on exactly what this means.  Although in many cases institutions apply 
little or no consideration and the outcome is simple,10 when institutions pro-
vide some consideration, even if perfunctory, it becomes difficult for courts 
to determine whether the consideration is sufficient.  This is due in part to 
the courts‘ failure thus far to adopt principles for the evaluation of diversity 
reviews.  Extrajudicial guidance on this issue is also limited, consisting of 
one or two government reports,11 various trade and professional publications 
by attorneys for organizations such as the College Board,12 and one law re-
view article.13  Otherwise, the field is largely clear.  The claim that one does 
not even know what it would mean to ―seriously consider‖ race-neutral 
programs has some justification. 
II. THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS 
For those who would apply the serious-consideration requirement 
properly, the most difficult question is how to measure the likely success of 
race-neutral diversity programs.  If their effectiveness is to be evaluated, it 
must be evaluated against a particular standard.  Since many members of 
the higher education community think of diversity programs as efforts to 





  The President-Elect of the Association of American Law Schools, Rachel Moran, has confirmed 
the suspicion held by many observers outside of higher education, that colleges outside of California and 
Texas are largely ignoring this requirement.  See Rachel F. Moran, Symposium, Of Doubt and Diversi-
ty—The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 231 (2006) (―Despite 
federal efforts to promote these alternatives, colleges and universities have not paid as much attention to 
this part of the Grutter opinion.‖).  Some prominent higher education attorneys have claimed in conver-
sations with the author that some of their clients are taking this requirement seriously, but they have 
been unwilling to name the institutions that do so. 
11
  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., supra note 4; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AFTER ADARAND (2005) at xi. 
12
  See, e.g., ARTHUR COLEMAN, SCOTT R. PALMER & STEVEN WINNICK, RACE-NEUTRAL POLICIES 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO ACTION (forthcoming 2008); ARTHUR L. COLEMAN & SCOTT 
R. PALMER, ADMISSIONS AND DIVERSITY AFTER MICHIGAN: THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES (2006). 
13
  See La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2. 
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against their ability to achieve this goal.14  However, an institution‘s use of 
such narrow measures would likely indicate that its professed commitment 
to multifactored diversity is pretextual.  Alternatively, an institution seeking 
the judicially approved educational benefits flowing from multifactored di-
versity would logically measure the success of diversity programs in terms 
of their ability to achieve either multifactored diversity (indirect measures) 
or the educational benefits themselves (direct measures).15  That is to say, an 
institution might directly evaluate the extent to which diversity programs 
increase intergroup understandings, break down stereotypes, etc., or indi-
rectly evaluate the extent to which these programs foster the multifactored 
student diversity, which is expected to advance the pursuit of these goals. 
A. Racial Diversity Measures 
It is natural for most higher education participants and commentators 
to evaluate race-neutral admissions programs against their ability to in-
crease the representation of previously underrepresented student popula-
tions.16  Exclusive use of such measures, however, creates significant litiga-
litigation risk since it implies that race-conscious measures are employed to 
achieve impermissible racial balancing, rather than to yield the compelling 
educational benefits that flow from a multifactored diversity.  After all, the 
measure of success that an institution employs can speak volumes about the 
goals it is trying to achieve. 
For example, in 2000 the University of Texas at Austin bragged that its 
race-neutral Texas Ten Percent Plan had succeeded by enabling Texas to 
bring its 1999 enrollment for African-American and Hispanic students back 





  The transparency of these efforts to achieve particular racial compositions is one of the worst-
kept secrets in academe.  See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State 
Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 291–93 (2001); Kim Forde-Mazrui, 
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2332–34 (2000); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1042 (1998). 
15
  The concept of ―direct measures‖ is developed in Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alterna-
tive Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 (2001).  Roithmayr, however, develops the 
concept very differently than does this Essay.  For a discussion of ―direct measures,‖ in the context of 
serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives, see La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 (manuscript at 
34–35). 
16
  See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2346. 
17
  78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
18
  See Larry Faulkner, The “Top 10 Percent Law” Is Working for Texas, The Univ. of Tex. at Aus-
tin Office of the President, Oct. 19, 2000, 
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/faulknerstatement.html (link).  These boasts may 
come back to haunt Texas in light of subsequent developments.  After the Grutter decision came down, 
Texas replaced its percentage plan with a race-conscious approach, which is subject to a pending consti-
tutional challenge in Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008).  In that case, an unsuccess-
ful student applicant claims that Texas‘s current use of racial preferences is impermissible in light of 
Texas‘s admission that it not only seriously considered, but successfully adopted, a race-neutral alterna-
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Fifth Circuit‘s 1996 Hopwood decision had barred the use of race as a 
factor in student admissions.19  Based on Texas‘s public pronouncements, 
however, it is clear that the program measured its success based on its abili-
ty to enroll African-American and Hispanic students, rather than its ability 
to enroll students who exhibited the wide range of diversity-characteristics 
(economic, geographic, political) which a multifactored diversity scheme 
would seek.  Unsurprisingly, there is considerable evidence that this ―racial 
balancing‖ was indeed Texas‘s goal.20  While this goal has considerable 
support within the academy, it is decidedly not compelling in the eyes of 
contemporary affirmative action law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that, by itself, in-
creasing racial or ethnic representation is not a sufficiently compelling in-
terest to justify the use of racial preferences.21  Rather, the legally 
cognizable diversity interest consists of an institution‘s efforts to achieve 
the educational benefits that flow from the interchange of varied and op-
posed viewpoints and perspectives, as may be accomplished by admitting 
students who collectively create a multifactored diversity.22  To judge a plan 
exclusively against its ability to attract African-American and Hispanic stu-
dents would imply a pretextual character to the institution‘s pursuit of mul-
tifactored diversity.  To the extent that the educational benefits flowing 
from multifactored diversity are indirectly measured by a program‘s ability 
to produce such diversity, they must be measured according to numerous 
characteristics, and not just race and ethnicity. 
B. Indirect Measures 
Some may choose to measure RNAs according to their ability to 
achieve a multifactored diversity.  In other words, racially preferential prac-
tices will be measured against the ability of race-neutral alternatives to suc-
ceed, more or less as well, at achieving the full range of diversity 
characteristics which institutions seek as a means of achieving certain edu-
cational benefits.  These diversity characteristics may include race and eth-
nicity only as part of a wider range of attributes that may include 
socioeconomic, geographic, and ideological diversity, as well as a diversity 
                                                                                                                           
tive.  Fisher, 556 F. Supp at 605–06.  The Center for Equal Opportunity and civil rights activist Edward 
Blum have made similar claims in a complaint brought against Texas before the Office for Civil Rights. 
19
  See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962; Faulkner, supra note 18. 
20
  See Faulkner, supra note 18 (discussing increases in the admission and retention levels of Afri-
can-American and Hispanic students to the University of Texas at Austin since the Top Ten Percent Law 
took effect).  Michigan made precisely this point to the Supreme Court in Gratz, arguing that the ―pur-
pose and intended effect‖ of Texas‘s facially-neutral plan ―is to achieve some measure of racial diversi-
ty.‖  Brief for Respondents at 13, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), available at 
http://conlaw.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-516/02-516.mer.resp.lb.pdf (link). 
21
  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 314 (1978). 
22
  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
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of skills, interests, and experiences, and demonstrated ability to overcome 
different kinds of disadvantages.  
This approach is less likely to produce litigation than the narrower ra-
cial diversity measures but is also arguably less candid.  In many cases, the 
approach insulates diversity programs by concealing the social justice con-
cerns that motivated their creation.  In addition, for institutions that sincere-
ly seek the educational benefits that flow from diversity—or at least claim 
to do so—indirect measures are at best weak indicia of that ultimate goal.  
Furthermore, absent unusual considerations, an exclusive reliance upon in-
direct measures may also appear pretextual.  Why not measure educational 
benefits directly if this is the motivation for diversity programs? 
Even accepting that educational benefits flow from multifactored di-
versity, this does not mean that diversity attributes can serve as a proxy for 
educational achievement.  A program that garners the requisite diversity 
may not capture the educational benefits that are expected to flow from it.  
The focus should be on the extent to which various diversity programs are 
able to translate educational strategies (attaining multifactored diversity) in-
to ultimate goals (specific educational benefits).  Unless the ultimate educa-
tional goals are immeasurable, there can be no excuse for an institution‘s 
failure to measure them in any evaluation that purports to constitute ―se-
rious consideration.‖ 
C. Direct Measures 
If an institution‘s purpose in pursuing affirmative action is to produce 
the educational benefits that flow from multifactored diversity—the only 
permissible purpose according to the Supreme Court—then the measure of 
that institution‘s success, logically, should be its ability to achieve those 
educational benefits.  Given the seriousness with which the Court treats any 
form of racial preference, it follows that serious consideration of race-
neutral alternatives must include an assessment of whether those alterna-
tives can achieve the same (or equally worthy) educational benefits as a 
proposed racially conscious scheme.  In other words, to pass court scrutiny, 
institutions must seriously consider whether the same level of educational 
attainment believed to be available through the inclusion of racial and eth-
nic criteria in a multifactored diversity approach can also be achieved 
through nonracial means.  Despite its logical basis, there are two problems 
facing this approach. 
The first problem with the direct educational benefits approach is that 
there is no broad consensus on what those benefits are or whether race-
conscious actions actually achieve them—particularly when they are not 





  See Mitchell J. Chang, Nida Denson, Victor Sáenz & Kimberly Misa, The Educational Benefits of 
Sustaining Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates, 77 J. HIGHER ED. 430, 432 (May/Jun 
2006) (―[T]he research literature suggests that the educational potential of ‗diversity‘ is not reducible 
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The extent to which even race-conscious measures have succeeded in at-
taining educational benefits has been widely disputed in the literature, as 
the Court has more recently recognized in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools.24  Even those who support preferential programs sometimes ob-
serve that racial diversity alone is insufficient to achieve educational bene-
fits absent additional measures to promote active engagement.25  If racially-
conscious programs do not achieve demonstrable educational benefits, their 
failure is not a shortcoming of the direct benefits measure; rather, this fail-
ure would suggest a deficiency in either the manner in which the programs 
are designed and executed or the justification for the use of racial prefe-
rences.  Some diversity advocates, however, have long insisted that diversi-
ty yields strong benefits in a host of areas, including both higher education 
and the public schools.26  In Grutter, for example, the University of Michi-
gan successfully persuaded the Supreme Court, based in significant part on 
the work of Patricia Gurin, that student diversity yields important educa-
tional benefits.  Specifically, Michigan argued that its law school‘s ―admis-
sions policy promotes ‗cross-racial understanding,‘ helps to break down 
racial stereotypes, and ‗enables [students] to better understand persons of 
different races.‘‖27  Diversity programs must identify specific, demonstrable 
educational benefits and determine whether their race-conscious programs 
achieve those benefits more effectively than RNAs do. 
Michigan‘s proffered educational benefits may serve as an illustrative 
example.  Suppose that an institution seeks, as did Michigan, to promote 
cross-racial understanding, break down racial stereotypes, and enable stu-
dents to better understand persons of different races.  A less deferential 
court might be suspicious of an institution that defines educational goals in 
such racially conscious ways; after all, if the goal is entirely educational, 
                                                                                                                           
simply to the mere presence of members of underrepresented groups; rather, its value appears to depend 
on whether it leads to greater engagement in diversity related activities.‖) (citation omitted). 
24
  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776–79 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (―Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise 
from racial balancing.‖).  The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also recently reached this conclusion in 
the context of elementary and secondary education.  See U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENEFITS 
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 15 (2006), available 
at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf (finding that ―[t]here is little evidence that racial and 
ethnic diversity in elementary and secondary schools results in significant improvement in academic 
performance‖ and that ―[s]tudies of whether racial and ethnic diversity result in significant social and 
non-educational benefits report varied results‖) (link). 
25
  See, e.g., P. Gurin, E.L. Dey, S. Hurrado & G. Gurin, 72 Diversity and Higher Education: Theory 
and Impact on Educational Outcomes, HARV. ED. REV. 330, 333 (2002), available at 
http://www.edreview.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/harvard02/2002/fa02/f02gurin.htm 
(―[S]tructural diversity is a necessary but insufficient condition for maximal educational benefits; there-
fore, the theory that guides our study is based on students‘ actual engagement with diverse peers.‖) 
(link). 
26
  This issue continues to generate considerable controversy.  See generally La Noue & Marcus, su-
pra note 2 (manuscript at 34 n.144 and sources cited therein). 
27
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a) (alteration in original). 
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then why should a college not seek the broadest range of cross-cultural un-
derstandings, the removal of all cultural stereotypes, and the cultivation of 
better understanding of all people?  Either way, however, these educational 
goals are clearly measurable, as Dr. Gurin‘s expert report in the Michigan 
case established.28  Institutions can measure the extent to which they are 
achieved through different programs: student admissions programs, student 
exchange programs, freshman orientation training, travel abroad programs, 
ethnic studies courses, experiential learning courses, etc. 
Second, a diversity program that achieves educational benefits without 
increasing the representation of underrepresented groups may still be consi-
dered a failure within the higher education community (and by the institu-
tion‘s accreditors).  It has been argued that most people form their positions 
on racially preferential admissions at least partly on the basis of moral prin-
ciple.29  For such persons, it may be unsatisfactory to consider only the di-
rect benefits of diversity programs.  After all, a pure direct benefits measure 
may validate a diversity program on its ability to raise overall diversity-
related educational attainment even if the program entirely failed to increase 
the enrollment of minority students.  Diversity advocates typically support 
higher education diversity at least in part as an ultimate end, not only as an 
instrumental good.  Alternatively, even if an institution is primarily moti-
vated by the educational benefits, which it believes will flow from diversity, 
it may still favor racial and ethnic diversity as a means to accomplish that 
ultimate goal, based on independent (if nonpredominant) considerations fa-
voring diversity.  This second problem, however, arises from institutions 
called on their bluffs about being motivated solely by educational benefits.  
In this respect, the problem is merely a superficial—and improper—barrier 
to implementing a direct measure approach. 
Diversity policies are predicated on their ability to yield educational 
benefits; it would thus be appropriate for the institution to adopt policies 
which maximize the full range of benefits that diversity is said to advance, 
not just those which align with social justice values which may be em-
braced by some portion of the university community.  Ideally, this approach 
will enable the institution to focus with undiminished concentration upon its 
ultimate educational goals. 
CONCLUSION 
The serious-consideration requirement deserves much more attention 





  See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin at § V.D., Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-
75928), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/studies.html (discussing 
the report‘s methods for measuring growth and development among college students) (link). 
29
  See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 
170 (2003); Kenneth L. Marcus, The Right Frontier for Civil Rights Reform, 19 GEO. MASON CIV. RTS. 
L. J. (forthcoming Oct. 2008) (manuscript at 40, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
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rability of RNAs, they are now deeply embedded in contemporary affirma-
tive action jurisprudence.  Since Grutter, it is now unmistakably clear that 
state actors and federally assisted agencies (including universities) that em-
ploy racial or ethnic preferences (including universities) must engage in a 
serious evaluative process to determine whether these preferences could be 
replaced by effective RNAs. 
Some may argue that any sustained explication of the Supreme Court‘s 
serious-consideration requirement affords the Court‘s affirmative action ju-
risprudence a degree of literalness that it does not merit.  Those who are 
more cynical or more skeptical may not take the Court at its word, seeing 
the serious-consideration requirement as mere lip-service to a traditional 
narrow-tailoring element which has been rendered insignificant in light of 
the degree of deference, which the Court afforded to the University of 
Michigan‘s perfunctory consideration in Grutter.30  Yet it cannot be gainsa-
id that the Court has continued to give teeth to the serious-consideration re-
quirement as recently as Parents Involved in Community Schools.31  As long 
as the serious-consideration requirement remains a part of affirmative ac-
tion jurisprudence, it has a potential bite which may be more lethal than any 
other element of the strict scrutiny analysis.  While many institutions appar-
ently still ignore this requirement, or only perfunctorily purport to satisfy it, 
they do so at considerable litigation risk. 
When universities evaluate the various available RNAs, they must se-
lect a measure against which to determine their effectiveness.  The most 
obvious measure—their ability to maintain or increase minority enroll-
ment—is also the surest legal loser.  Other measures also have problems 
which are more subtle.  In a nutshell, if institutions seek the educational 
benefits that flow from diversity, they may gauge their success either direct-
ly (by measuring educational benefits themselves) or indirectly (by measur-
ing the diversity intended to produce such benefits).  While indirect 
measures may have features that are attractive from the perspective of some 
social justice concerns, they are significantly less convincing as a means of 
demonstrating compliance with applicable law.  In the end, there is no subs-





  See La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 (manuscript at 13–14). 
31
  See 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760–61 (2007). 
